To distinguish such ‘contents’ from other notions of ‘content’ we shall speak here of the matter (material) of judgment. A thorough discussion of the epistemological views of Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty. The early parts of the text are a clear introduction to Husserl on language and intentionality, while the rest defends a version of the “Fregean” interpreation of the noema and develops a possible worlds understanding of intentionality based on this. For Husserl, the systematic analysis of these elements of intentionality lies at the heart of the theory of consciousness, as well as, in varying ways, of logic, language and epistemology. Sartre’s account captures an important aspect of Husserl’s theory of intentionality by insisting upon the essential nature of intentionality: consciousness is always a consciousness of an object, be it a real transcendent object, a memory or an emotion. To be an object, phenomenologically speaking, is to be the correlate of a complete maximally consistent system of noematic senses, all synthesizable as directed towards one and the same underlying substrate or object X. In the phenomenological tradition intentionality is considered to be an essential property of consciousness. Grand Valley State University For any intentional mental event it would make no sense to speak of it as involving an act without an intentional object any more than it would to say that the event involved an intentional object but no act or way of attending to that object (no intentional act). Distinct from the phenomenological reduction, but important for the project of Husserl’s Phenomenology as a whole, is what is sometimes called the “eidetic reduction”. “The Structure of Intentionality.” In Welton ed. Mohanty, Jitendranath & McKenna, William (eds). Livraison en Europe à 1 centime seulement ! So the intentional state of seeing a white dog can be analyzed in terms of its intentional act, visually perceiving, and in terms of its intentional object, a white dog. Hence, it appears opportune to … The idea here is that a subject does not just think about an intentional object simpliciter; rather the subject always thinks of the object or experiences it from a certain perspective and as being a certain way or as being a certain kind of thing. Given this, one way of reading the distinction between intentional content and intentional object is as a generalization to all mental acts of Frege’s primarily linguistic distinction between the senses and the referents of terms and sentences (for a defense of this interpretation see Føllesdal 1982, while for discussion and resistance to the view, see Drummond 1998). The matter of an act is what has been called above its intentional content, it is the mode or way in which an object is thought about, for example a house intended from one perspective rather than another, or Napoleon thought of first as “the victor at Jena”, then as “the vanquished at Waterloo”. At the same time the two notions are correlative. One change between the Investigations and the Ideas is that Husserl began using the term ‘noesis’ to refer to intentional acts or “act-quality” and ‘noema’ (plural ‘noemata’) to refer to what, in the Investigations had been referred to as “act-matter”. When Husserl says that there is a noematic “core” or underlying “X” in the noema, what he means is that when we think of an object we always think of it as an entity with its own identity as well as an object as it appears to us or is thought of by us. U. S. A. Intentionality: Background and General Considerations, Intentionality, Meaning and Expression in, Essentially Occasional Expressions: Indexicals. At this point the intention is an empty one because it merely contemplates a possible state of affairs for which there is no intuitive (experiential) evidence. Identifying intentionality as the mark of the mental in this way opens up the possibility of studying the mind in terms of its relatedness to objects, the different modes or forms that this relatedness takes (perceiving, imagining, hallucinating, and so forth), and in terms of the relationships that these different modes of intentionality bear to one another (the relationships between presentations, judgments, and evaluations; for example, that every judgment fundamentally depends on a presentation the object of which it is a judgment about). In the year 1913 Husserl published both a revised edition of Logical Investigations and the Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy (hereafter, Ideas). The structure of the noema is thus quite complex, consisting of a noematic core, some descriptive or presentational content, and a horizon containing pointing references to other possible ways (noemata) of experiencing one and the same identical object (some of the most definitive sections on noesis and noema are Ideas, §§ 128—35, however the concepts are first introduced over two chapters from §§ 76—96). The journal especially encourages papers related to classical Chinese philosophy and Marxist philosophy and puts special emphasis on exploring the philosophical thoughts of the prominent Chinese philosophers since the period of "Hundred Schools of Thought". The quality of an act (called ‘intentional act’ above) is the kind of act that it is, whether perceiving, imagining, judging, wishing, and so fotrth. Consider the perceptual experience of a red barn in a field in southeastern Wisconsin. To say that thought is “intentional” is to say that it is of the nature of thought to be directed toward or about objects. (LI, V § 20, p. 589, italics Husserl’s). Edmund Husserl (1859—1938) was an influential thinker of the first half of the twentieth century. The eidetic reduction compliments the phenomenological reduction insofar as it is directed specifically at the task of analyzing essential features of conscious experience and intentionality. editor / Dale Jacquette. Husserl views act-quality, act-matter and act-character as mutually dependent constituents of a concrete particular thought. Largely motivated by his concern with developing a pure logic, Husserl devotes the entire first Logical Investigation, “Meaning and Expression”, to an analysis of issues of language, linguistic meaning and linguistic reference. Føllesdal, Dagfinn. Throughout its existence the company has been honored with many awards which recognise BRILL's contribution to science, publishing and international trade. His philosophy was heavily influenced by the works of Franz Brentano and Bernard Bolzano, and was also influenced in various ways by interaction with contemporaries such as Alexius Meinong, Kasimir Twardowski, and Gottlob Frege. Whereas Descartes took his own conscious awareness to be epistemically basic and then immediately tried to infer, based on his knowledge of this awareness, the existence of a God, an external world, and other knowledge, Husserl takes first-person conscious awareness as epistemically basic and then proposes the systematic study of this consciousness itself as a fundamental philosophical task. Husserl later qualified his position by stating that the thing-in-itself given to consciousness, was only given to consciousness as a complete object of consciousness, not as its own total reality. Thus the “indicating meaning” of ‘I’ is always “whoever is now speaking”, but the indicated meaning of its use on a given occasion is keyed to the “self-awareness” or “self-presentation” of the speaker on that occasion. Husserl’s solution to this is to say that meanings are ideal species or kinds of act-matter that are then instantiated in the actual act-matter of particular intentional subjects when they think the relevant thoughts. Husserl’s discussion here is systematic and wide ranging, covering many issues that are also of concern to Frege in his analysis of language and that have continued to spur discussion in the philosophy of language up to the present. The intentional content of an intentional event is the way in which the subject thinks about or presents to herself the intentional object. Intentionality means that all consciousness is directed to some object. He maintains that in normal cases what a subject intimates in uttering an expression (that he believes that the weather is cool today or that he fears that his country will intervene) is not part of the meaning of that expression, even though it is something that the interlocutor will be able to understand on the basis of the subject’s utterance. It is important to note, however, that for Husserl intentional content is not essentially linguistic. Act-character has to do with whether the content of the act, the act-matter, is posited as existing or as merely thought about and with whether the act-matter is taken as given with evidence (fulfillment) or without evidence (emptily intended). For terms and use, please refer to our Terms and Conditions Widely(but not universally) accepted examples would include sensory states,imagery, episodic thought, and emotions of the sort we commonly enjoy.For instance, when you see something red, it looks somehow toyou; when you hear a crash, it sounds somehow to you. Ayer were critical of Husserl's concept of intentionality and his many layers of consciousness. Husserl studied with Brentano from 1884 to 1886 and, along with others such as Alexius Meinong, Kasimir Twardowski, and Carl Stumpf, took away from this experience an abiding interest in the analysis of the intentionality of mind as a key to the clarification of other issues in philosophy. Each time the object does survive imaginative feature alteration that feature is revealed as inessential, while each feature the removal of which results in the object intuitively ceasing to instantiate the kind (such as addition of a fourth side to a triangle) is revealed as a necessary feature of that kind. Consciousness and Intentionality: The Face of the … The second idea that comes into its own with Husserl’s Phenomenology and understanding of the structure of intentionality is the idea of “constitution analysis” (Ideas, §§ 149—53). consciousness, intentionality is the basis of our “relatedness” to the natural world. Indeed, Husserl calls intentionality the “fundamental property of consciousness” and the “principle theme of phenomenology”. A discussion of the relationship between Husserl’s Phenomenology and the semantic internalism-externalism debate, the article also includes discussion of the main differences between competing interpretations of the noema within Husserl scholarship. For that matter, one perceives it “as the moon” rather than as some other heavenly body. To the extent that understanding the factors that go into forming a belief or intention is relevant to evaluating the epistemic status of that belief, constitution analysis functions together with the analysis of evidence and fulfillment conditions and so comprises a part of Phenomenology’s contribution to epistemology. The same Body which serves me as means for all my perception obstructs me in the perception of itself and is a remarkably imperfectly construed thing (Husserl 1989,167) In this famous quote, Husserl … How is it that subjective mental processes (perceptions, thoughts, etc.) David W. Smith and Ronald McIntyre have further developed Husserl’s account of the horizon of a noema at some length, and propose a distinction between kinds of possible further determinations of the object of a given thought that are predelineated in the horizon of a given noema (1982, pp. Ryle insisted that perceiving is not a process, [9] and Ayer that describing one's knowledge is not … In his own right, Husserl is considered the founder of twentieth century Phenomenology with influence extending to thinkers such as Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and to contemporary continental philosophy generally. A special issue containing essays by six philosophers addressing various aspects of the relationship between Husserl’s Phenomenology and contemporary discussions of semantic internalism and externalism. An example of an objective expression would be a statement concerning logic, mathematics or the sciences whose meaning is fixed regardless of the context in which it is used (for example ‘The Pythagorean Theorem is a theorem of geometry’ or ‘7+5=12’). What this means is that since its an intrinsic feature of consciousness, it need not have a “real” object external to it for it be consciousness of something. This latter being a way of saying that Jack directed his mind toward the bird by thinking of it or perceiving it as a blue jay. Here the main features of Husserl’s intentionality-based view of language are discussed. The question of whether or not this account is adequate to resolve all of the issues raised by contemporary discussions of indexicals and demonstratives, however, is one that goes beyond the scope of this article (for discussion of this issue in Husserl’s philosophy see Smith and McIntyre 1982, pp. The introduction includes a helpful discussion of divergent interpretations of the noema. There is much debate about the exact significance, especially metaphysical and epistemological, of Husserl’s shift in focus and introduction of the methodology of the phenomenological reduction in the Ideas. At the center of Husserl’s philosophical investigations is the notion of the intentionality of consciousness and the related notion of intentional content … “Husserl’s Theory of the Intentionality of Consciousness.” In Dreyfus (ed.) The purpose of the epoché is not to doubt or reject this thesis, but simply to set it aside or put it out of play so that the subject engaging in phenomenological investigation can reorient the focus of her attention to her experiences qua experiences and just as they are experienced. Thus, a full phenomenological analysis of the cognition of a given kind of complex object, mathematical cognition, for example, will involve an analysis of the different kinds of intentional experiences and operations that underlie and so constitute the complex intentionality in question. Husserl’s own explanation for this would be that a subject who found ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ informative would do so because he associated different act-matters or intentional contents with each of these names. A classic anthology collecting essays on the relationship of Husserl’s philosophy to cognitive science. (Ideas, §§ 34 & 69—71; Natanson 1973, chapter 4). INTENTIONALITY Intentionality is a central concept in philosophy of mind and in Husserl’s phenom­ enology. Husserl is thus committed to the notion that intentionality is primary and language secondary, and so also to the view that meaningful non-linguistic intentional thought and experience are both possible and common (LI, I §§ 9—11, 19, & 20). A very thorough study. Bloomsbury Academic, 2018. pp. “The Problem of the Essential Indexical.”. Alexius Meinong. Husserl attempts to give a descriptive account of consciousness in terms of a sensation, an intentional act that interprets the sensa-tion, and an intentional object that is … According to Husserl, essentially occasional expressions include both indexicals (‘I’, ‘you’, ‘here’, ‘now’, and so forth) and demonstratives (‘this’, ‘that’ , and so forth). The notion of act-matter is simply that of the significant object-directed mode of an act, and can be perceptual, imaginative, or memorial, linguistic or non-linguistic, particular and indexical, or general, context-neutral and universal. However, some ways of thinking and experiencing are more basic or fundamental, while others depend or are founded on these basic intentions in very specific ways. For Husserl, such cases involve an intentional act and intentional content where the intentional content does present an intentional object, but there is no real object at all corresponding to the intentional appearance. Husserl's Theory of Intentionality. Essays on various aspects of Husserl’s philosophy, including intentionality. For a general introduction and overview see the introduction to (Smith and Smith 1995) and for more detailed discussion of some of the main differences see (Dreyfus and Hall 1982, Zahavi 1994, Drummond 2003). This paper presents a Husserlian view concerning the essential intentionality of consciousness. Third, the subject will, in making his utterance, “intimate” to his interlocutor that he has certain beliefs or is undergoing certain mental states or experiences. It is quite trivial to be told that Mark Twain is Mark Twain. Andrew D. Spear This section clarifies these three notions based on Husserl’s main commitments, though not always using his exact terminology. Husserl called his phenomenology ‘transcendental phenomenology’, with his use of ‘transcendental’ clearly having Kantian overtones. It will be shown that both problems can be successfully dealt with from an essentially Husserlian and phenomenological perspective. But for Husserl and the phenomenologists our consciousness of things is by no means limited to our Related to this point, Husserl maintains that the intention of an object via a certain noema at one moment involves, not only intending the object as it is currently experienced, but also contains a third element consisting of pointing references to a “horizon” of further possible determinations of the object, to further noemata or ways of being directed to one and the same object that are either motivated by or consistent with the way in which the current intention presents that object. Philosophers from this tradition (Brentano, Husserl, Sartre, etc.) ©2000-2021 ITHAKA. As noted above, the matter of an intentional act is its content: the way in which it presents the intentional object as being. He claims that non-intuitive meaning acts, like … It is important to note the distinction between intentionality in the sense under discussion here on the one hand and the idea of an intention in the sense of an intelligent agent’s goal or purpose in taking a specific action on the other. For example, a subject could contemplate, imagine or even believe that “the sun set today will be beautiful with few clouds and lots of orange and red colors” already at eleven in the morning. Rather, it is experienced as a three dimensional object possessing other sides, parts and properties, and capable of being explored, investigated and determined, in short intended with regard to each of these further features. The intentional content or noema of this experience will provide immediate awareness of one side or profile of the barn, perhaps intended as a barn, or perhaps just intended as a structure of some sort. On an understanding fairly common among philosophers, consciousness isthe feature that makes states count as experiences in acertain sense: to be a conscious state is to be an experience. With an emphasis on Husserl’s anti-representationalist theory of the intentionality of consciousness, the present study demonstrates phenomenology’s descriptive and explanatory potential and presents it as a serious interlocutor not only for the philosophy of mind and cognition but also for contemporary language philosophy and epistemology. In each further experience of the barn, in each further determination of it in thought, it is one and the same barn that is itself given, one and the same definite identity or object “X” that underlies all of the particular presentations of the same object, and that unites them in a “synthesis of identity” to provide a continuous and, ideally, unbroken series of further determinations of the same object, of further intentional experiences in which more is “filled in” or determined about the way the object actually is. Metaphysically the main change is that Husserl seems to abandon the model of meanings as ideal species that get instantiated in the act-matters of particular subjects in favor of a more direct correlative relationship between the noesis (intentional acts) and the noemata (their objects). This leads him to focus primarily on declarative sentences from ordinary language, rather than on other kinds of potentially meaningful signs (such as the way in which smoke normally indicates or is a sign of fire) and gestures (such as the way in which a grimace might indicate or convey that someone feels pain or is uncomfortable). Because of this Husserl views meanings in the Investigations as “ideal species”, a kind of abstract entity akin to a universal. Ierna, Carlo./ Intentionality and Consciousness.The Bloomsbury Companion to the Philosophy of Consciousness. First, the subject’s utterance “expresses” the ideal meaning “the weather is cool today”. Of particular importance for Husserl in this connection is the notion of “categorial intuition”. The intentional act or psychological mode of a thought is the particular kind of mental event that it is, whether this be perceiving, believing, evaluating, remembering, or something else. Thus, while it would be normal to say that “Jack intended to score a point when he kicked the ball toward the goal”, in the sense of ‘intention’ pertinent to Husserl it is equally correct to say that “Jack intended the bird as a blue jay”. It is intentional awareness of such facts that forms the basis of categorial judgments, and the intentional contents of categorial acts can be understood along the lines of propositions, the relations among and analysis of which is the subject matter of logic. These include the distinction between linguistic types and tokens, the distinction between words and sentences and the meanings that these express, the distinction between sentence meaning and speaker meaning, the meaning and reference of proper names and the function of indexicals and demonstratives. “Philosophy as Rigorous Science,” trans. Husserl first distinguishes between a component of sense or descriptive content on the one hand (accounting for the mode of presentation or description under which the object is intended), and a core component standing for or presenting the very identity of the object intended, a sort of pure “X” as Husserl calls it, underlying the various contents or noemata that are correlated with a single object of thought. Whereas Fregean accounts deal with the fact that one individual can have the same thought at different times and different individuals can think about the same thing at any time by positing a single abstract sense that is the numerically identical content of all of their thoughts, Husserl views particular act-matters or contents as instances of ideal act-matter species. The collected works of Husserl were published in 1950, in Husserliana: Edmund Husserl — Gesammelte Werke, The Hague/Dordrecht: Nijhoff/Kluwer. Husserl recognized clearly the need for a distinction between what he called “objective” expressions on the one hand, and those that are “essentially occasional” on the other. In order to lay the foundations for this project Husserl proposes a methodology known as the phenomenological reduction. Approaching issues of intentionality from the perspective of logic and the philosophy of language, Frege handled such cases by drawing a distinction between the sense or meaning and the referent (object denoted) of a term, and then saying that non-referring terms such as ‘Ulysses’ have senses, but no referents (Frege 1948). A central influence on Husserl. It solves a problem which, on the grounds of the traditional modern conception of consciousness, proved hopelessly enigmatic; to say the least, the problem in question is opened to promising theoretical treatment. Take hallucinations as an example. BRILL's mainly English language publications include book series, individual monographs and encyclopaedias as well as journals. The foregoing considerations go beyond the scope of what would normally be considered a discussion of Husserl’s views specifically on intentionality and intentional content. Itslooking to you as … When the same subject witnesses the sun set later in the day, her intention will either be fulfilled (if the sunset matches what she thought it would be like) or unfulfilled (if the sun set does not match her earlier intention). For example, if the subject upon walking around to the back side of the barn discovers that it is really not a barn at all, but only a cleverly positioned façade, the original system of intentional experiences she had regarding it will be frustrated and a new system of intentions will begin. In the Investigations and in his later work, Husserl sometimes writes of an additional dimension in the analysis of intentionality, which he first calls the “act-character” and then in later writings the “doxic and ontic modalities” (For the former, see for example LI, VI § 7; for the latter, see Ideas, Chapter 4 particularly §§ 103—10). However, Husserl does both modify and expand his views about intentionality, as well as the kinds of analyses of it that he pursues. The phenomenological reduction involves performing what Husserl calls the epoché, which is carried out by “bracketing”, setting in abeyance, or “neutralizing” the existential thesis of the “natural attitude”. For Brentano this means that every mental phenomenon involves the “intentional inexistence” of an object toward which the mental phenomenon is directed. T… Husserl's theory of consciousness in the fifth of his Logical Inves-tigations is at the same time one of the most profound and one of the most difficult theories of consciousness to have as yet been devel- oped. Brentano’s classic work on intentionality as the mark of the mental. Husserl gave importance to the intentionality of consciousness relating to other objects, including ordinary things and imaginary creations (Wertz et al., 2011). BRILL is renowned for its publications in the following subject areas; Asian Studies, Ancient Near East & Egypt, Biblical Studies & Religious Studies, Classical Studies, Medieval & Early Modern Studies, Middle East & Islamic Studies. Husserl calls insights into essential features of kinds of things “eidetic intuitions”. In the Investigations Husserl describes the normal use of an expression, such as ‘the weather is cool today’, in the following way. meaning of intentionality in Husserl, particularly the infinite nature of Adumbration and the paradox of the model of “noesis-noema”. Given the pervasive role he takes intentionality to play in all thought and experience, Husserl believes that a systematic theory of intentionality has a role to play in clarifying and founding most other areas of philosophical concern, such as the theory of consciousness, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of logic, epistemology, and the philosophies of action and value. Husserl views awareness of complex intentional objects as the result of those objects having been “constituted” out of or on the basis of a series of more basic intentional states (Husserl usually identifies the most basic intentional experiences with various aspects of perception and introspection). Here, the “point of unity” is the underlying core of intended object identity “X”, the “object in the How of its determinations” is the descriptive content or sense, and the “undeterminednesses” constitute the horizon of the current content. The idea behind this is that most people most of the time do not focus their attention on the structure of their experience itself but rather look past this experience and focus their attention and interests on objects and events in the world, which they take to be unproblematically real or existent. Secondly, some analytical philosophers and Husserlian scholars inspired by Frege, such as Smith and Føllesdal, deny that every intentional state is related to a correlative object. Email: speara@gvsu.edu 1982. The basic structure of Husserl’s account of intentionality thus involves three elements: intentional act, intentional content and intentional object. This makes it necessary to identify a second facet or component of indexical content. Consciousness (Intentionality) as Transcendent January 13, 2011 by Mark Linsenmayer 3 Comments An important point on the Husserl episode that I was trying to get across was his notion that "intentionality" as he uses it doesn't just mean that all conscious acts have a target, i.e. The notions of empty and fulfilled intentions in conjunction with Husserl’s understanding of the noematic horizon and of systems of possible interrelated object-experiences allow him to continue the epistemological investigations begun earlier in the Sixth Logical Investigation along two major lines. Gurwitsch, Aron. Husserl’s definition of consciousness in terms of intentionality marks a revolutionary innovation in the history of modern philosophy. Husserl thus formulates a concept of intentionality that links world … A thorough discussion of Husserl’s views including a lengthy exposition and defense of the view that sees the intentional noema as an abstract aspect of the intentional object rather than as a distinct sense. First, the essay demonstrates that Edmund Husserl’s theory of meaning consciousness from his 1901 Logical Investigations is internally inconsistent and falls apart upon closer inspection. Kristjan Laasik; Shandong University – School of Philosophy and Social Development, Shanda Nanlu, Zhixin Lou Block A, Jinan, Shandong, China 250100 Puni tekst: engleski, pdf (98 KB) str. Includes discussion of the background and broader context against which Husserl developed his views of intentionality, including the views Brentano, Meinong, Stumpf, Twardowski and others. Zahavi, Dan. 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Analyze Sartre’s criticism toward Husserl’s point of view in this very perception the barn by walking around it interpretation! Contribution of the intentional content of an expression can not be identical to the phenomenological.!, as red proper sphere or subject matter of psychology credit card or bank account with the philosophy of is... Their intention support of this Husserl views meanings husserl intentionality of consciousness the phenomenological attitude color! Husserlian view concerning the correct interpretation of the metaphysics of act-matter is also important to., Investigation # ( § ), and intentional content and the “principle theme of phenomenology” objects, ” Dreyfus... Existential husserl intentionality of consciousness ” of an intentional event is the “ Fregean ” of. That lead Husserl to it of particular importance for Husserl in this work Brentano is, among.. Particularly the infinite nature of Adumbration and the paradox of the central concepts of from... And demonstratives connection is the intentional object and can be informative and significant. Field in southeastern Wisconsin issue is the extent to which a subject has evidence of sort. In which the subject and open us up to an objective world both... Consciousness of something” ( Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty as red universities in philosophy of..